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Abstract
This paper examines Robert Nozick’s principle of justice in acqusitions that he suggests for the just appropriation of property. The work is 
mainly concentrated on the proviso suggested for the principle. The contention here is situated on the issues of Nozick’s reconstruction of Locke’s 
original version of the proviso and his claim that the principle is a ‘historical and non-patterend principle’. I will textually criticise Nozick’s 
understanding of his own version of the proviso and, while clarifiying his own version of the proviso, I will raise contextual problems concern-
ing his misunderstanding. Ultimately, these issues are considered as crucially vital problems for this latter claim. His principle, conclusively, 
is not obligied only to serve for private property, but it can also work for other systems of property as well. This last point is quite unexpected 
and unwanted for Nozick himself. Hence, the principle clamped with the Nozickean proviso, does not compatible with Nozick’s claim of being 
‘historical and non-patterned’. 
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INTRODUCTION
Robert Nozick in, “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” 
[2] defends the claim that the state should only have 
“the function of protection against force, theft, fraud, 
enforcement of contracts, and so on” [3]. He opposes any 
other justifications of the state, which are aimed to extend 
its functions. Accordingly, theories, such as liberalism 
or utilitarianism, will support many enforcement 
rights, which are against the basic liberties of men. 
His project of the ‘minimal’ or ‘night-watchman state’ 
is constructed on the rights of property and individual 
freedom. His conception of the minimal state turns out 
to be a ‘dominant protection agency’, which protects 
the rights [4] of its clients. In this big framework of the 
minimal state, Nozick gives an account for distributive 
justice; namely the ‘Entitlement Theory’. By means of 
this, Nozick wants to disregard many roles of the state 
that we can observe in liberal theories. For instance, most 
significantly, the coercive power of the state concerning 
redistributive justice is one of the elements of the state 
that Nozick wants to eliminate. 
In this article I will argue against Nozick’s claims 
about the initial acquisition of property. So, any other 
part of his theory is not going to be issued in this paper. 
Hence, my objections will directly attack to his notion of 
right to property and the principles of just holdings, no 
further argument about his theory of the minimal state 
will be derivative from my claims here.
For Nozick, property ownership is an essential 
liberty in ASU and the initial acquisition of property is 
legitimate. I will claim that Nozick’s principle for the 
just initial acquisition contains problems that make his 
claims problematic. In order to reach this conclusion, 
first I will underline two crucial inconsistencies: the 
distinction between time-slice principles of justice and 
historical principles [5], and the distinction of patterned 
and non-patterned principles [6]. After this consultation, 
I will discuss the proviso that Nozick suggests for the 
principle of just initial acquisitions of holdings. In order 
to do that, first I will put forward the Lockean proviso, 
which underlies Nozick’s adaptation of it. Following 
this, I will show Nozick’s version of the proviso and 
how he fails to construct his version and misunderstands 
his own formulation of the proviso. In terms of this, 
the clarification of the Nozickean proviso will proceed. 
Considering the Nozickean proviso, I will argue that 
his principle cannot be a historical and non-patterned 
principle. And finally, due to Nozick’s failure of seeing 
private property without rivals, I will show how his 
proviso can lead the Entitlement Theory towards systems 
like common ownership or joint ownership.
A Preliminary Discussion of the Entitlement 
Theory: ‘Historical and Non-patterned Principle’
In Chapter 7 of “Anarchy, State, and Utopia” Nozick 
attacks those theories, which are claimed to have an 
unjust criterion for the distribution of property in society 
(i.e. Rawlsian and utilitarian theories), and he presents his 
defense of the Entitlement Theory. In this section, I will 
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briefly explain the general framework of the Entitlement 
Theory and the distinctions of ‘historical’ and ‘end-
result’ principles, and the ‘patterned’ and ‘non-patterned’ 
principles. In terms of this, I will touch some preliminary 
issues concerning his position on these distinctions. I will 
argue that the argument for the historicity of the principle 
of transfer of just holdings cannot work for the principle 
of initial acquisitions of just holdings.
Nozick says that justice in holdings has three major 
components. Firstly, there is the original acquisition 
of holdings, which is the appropriation of unowned 
externality: “This includes the issues of how unheld 
things may come to be held, the process, or processes, 
by which unheld things may come to be held (…) we 
shall refer to the complicated truth about this topic as the 
principle of justice in acquisition” [7]. Secondly, there is 
the transfer of holdings, which means to be the transition 
of property from one person to another: “Under this topic 
come general descriptions of voluntary exchange, and 
gift and (on the other hand) fraud, as well as reference 
to particular conventional details fixed upon in a given 
society. The complicated truth about this subject we shall 
call the principle of justice in transfer.” [8] Finally, there 
is the rectification of injustice in holdings, which is used 
for the rectification of unjust past transfers of holdings 
or initial acquisitions of holdings. According to Nozick, 
“This principle uses historical information about previous 
situations and injustices done in them, and information 
about the actual course of events that flowed from these 
injustices, until the present, and it yields a description of 
holdings in the society” [9]. So, for Nozick if a person 
acquires a holding entirely in accordance with the first 
two, then he is entitled to that holding. And if there is 
an entitlement, which is not accordance with these two 
principles of just holdings, then it should be rectified in 
accordance with the principle of rectification.  
Before dealing with the principle of initial acquisition 
of holdings, I will first outline the distinction between 
the ‘historical principles and end-result principles’, 
which is very important for Nozick because he wants 
to argue against other theories of distributive justice by 
accusing them for being ‘end-result principles’. Nozick 
claims that the entitlement theory of justice is a historical 
principle. This means that it looks for the process by 
which distribution came about. On the other hand, 
end-result principles deal with the distribution by how 
things are distributed. For the latter a patterned principle 
determines how things are distributed [10]. As an example 
of the latter, an egalitarian would examine a distribution 
of property by looking at the current distribution and 
determine who gains what and then apply an egalitarian 
principle in order to redistribute property.
On the other hand, a historical principle will look at 
past instances and actions of people when they acquire 
some property. Nozick thinks that because people 
might have acquired property justly, they are entitled to 
property, and the present inequality of holdings may not 
indicate that there is an injustice in holdings. Similarly, if 
there are instances in the past that show that an injustice 
took place when there was a transfer of holding, then we 
can rectify it not because there is unequal share in the 
present situation but historically there was an instance 
of injustice in the acquisition, or transfer of that holding 
[11]. It is, I think, fair enough to see the distinction 
between these two types of principles.
Nozick continues to say that the entitlement theory has 
the essence of being a historical principle and at the same 
time it has also another characteristic, which is being a 
non-patterned principle. Nozick calls, “[…] a principle of 
distribution patterned if it specifies that a distribution is 
to vary along some natural dimension, weighted sum of 
natural dimensions, or lexicographic ordering of natural 
dimensions. And let us say a distribution is patterned if 
it accords with some patterned principle” [12]. As we 
can see from this definition of patterned principles any 
principle, which has the ground of any guidance and, 
which gives account for the non-distributive command 
will fall short of being an un-patterned principle. For 
instance, a utilitarian principle, which says that the 
distribution should be made by maximizing the total 
amount of happiness, will be a patterned principle 
because it has a pattern of action, which is directed by the 
former principle. Because, the utilitarian principle does 
not deal with the ‘distributional matrices’, which means 
it has nothing to do with how the distribution occurred, 
it will follow this non-distributional pattern to execute 
the distribution of holdings. We can extend the instances 
of those by giving the examples of principles, which has 
moral patterns, or egalitarian purposes. In this case, the 
plausible principle for Nozick is: if the set of holdings 
results from just acquisition of holdings, or just transfer 
of it, then it is a principle that concerns only how the 
distribution have been historically made of. As he says 
that if some people receive a share of income, or gain it 
from gambling or receives a gift, etc, then these are the 
instances of non-patterned principles.
An intuitive reply to his former concern, which is also 
realized by Nozick, is to ask whether it is really the case 
that principles of the entitlement theory are un-patterned 
principles. Nozick has a quick reply to this. He says, 
Though the resulting set of holdings will be 
unpatterned, it will not be incomprehensible, for it can 
be seen as arising from the operation of a small number 
of principles. These principles specify how an initial 
distribution may arise (the principle of acquisition of 
holdings and how distributions may be transformed 
into others). The process whereby the set of holdings is 
generated will be intelligible, though the set of holdings 
itself that results from this process will be unpatterned 
[13].
As we can see Nozick thinks that even when we have 
these principles of just holdings, we cannot say that they 
are patterned, because they are the principles, which 
concerns the distribution of holdings historically and 
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not any other kind of criteria, which cannot be directly 
related to the distribution of holdings [14]. 
In this case, we may say that in comparison to the 
patterned current time-slice principles the principle of 
just transfer would be sufficient to be non-patterned. 
Because, this principle only concerns how a holding is 
obtained and not how this action is morally or politically 
good or bad, it seems that the principle of transfer has no 
pattern of regulation. The reason why Nozick’s principle 
of transfer might work is, as Nozick puts it, “Things 
come into the world already attached to people having 
entitlements over them” [15]. This statement would be 
accurate, if we look for the occasions, in which there are 
transfers of property. When we look at an act of transfer 
of property we might assume that the holding owned 
by the person who will transfer it and if the transfer is 
just, meaning that the person who will get the holding 
without theft, murder, etc, then the transfer is just and this 
is exactly what a historical non-pattern principle of just 
transfer requires. 
However, as many thinkers who oppose to Nozick 
say, the initial acquisition of property cannot be examined 
in the same way. The reason is simple. In order to look 
at a distribution as being just or unjust we need to know 
that the holding had been already acquired. In the case of 
an unowned object (basically un-appropriated land), it is 
not easy to determine that the person who appropriates 
the object has the right to own this land historically. It is 
because there would have been no past to the initial case 
by definition, and also the idea of historicity cannot be 
applied to the initial case of appropriation. I will come to 
that point in the following sections. 
One reply would be that we do not need to worry 
about the initial case of appropriation. Nozick claims that 
“things come into the world already attached to people 
having entitlements over them” [16], and he may continue 
saying that this assumption is sufficient to construct the 
entitlement theory as enough as to be hypothetically 
accurate. However, I think, Nozick’s consideration for 
the principle of just transfer would not work in the same 
manner for the principle of just initial acquisitions. Hillel 
Steiner remarks on this as the following, 
The problem here arises from the fact that, unlike 
other objects, the objects of appropriative rights do appear 
from nowhere and out of nothing and are not the results 
of individuals’ past actions. It is therefore not surprising 
that Locke’s rule for appropriation as well as Nozick’s 
adaptation of it prove, in the event, to be structural or 
end-state principles rather than historical ones [17].
As Steiner clearly puts it, because there is no historical 
entitlement of appropriation, no historical principle can 
be made for the distribution of initial holdings of natural 
resources. Because of this reason, which Nozick is also 
aware of, there must be a principle or a pattern in order 
for the acquisition to be just. Now then the next question 
to examine is what’s Nozick’s solution to the initial 
acquisition of holdings? 
Nozick considers the explanation of the initial 
acquisition as “adding a bit of complexity into the 
entitlement theory” [18].  However, actually, this 
assumption is the core of the fallacy of the whole 
entitlement theory. Why? Because, as I have pointed out 
Nozick starts the idea with an apparently false premise: 
that “things come into the world already attached to people 
having entitlements over them” [19]. It is apparently false 
because as it is a fact and also conceivable that human 
beings cannot create anything ex nihilo [20], so that any 
property must be in the first place unowned. Therefore, 
there is at least theoretically a step in which no property 
is owned by anyone. Ultimately, this step follows how 
the property initially acquired by people. Therefore, the 
right question to ask is: what right do people acquire 
over unowned land? G. A. Cohen makes a similar point. 
He asks, “[…] apart from how he in particular came to 
own it, with what right it came to be anyone’s private 
property in the first place” [21]. As he asks rightly, if 
the land is unowned how can someone acquire it and at 
the same time no other person has the right to acquire 
the same piece of materiality. In this case, even Nozick 
does not suggest a new principle of initial acquisition, 
but rather he adapts Locke’s principle of acquisition. He 
says that the principle of acquisition “is best approached 
by considering Locke’s attempt to specify a principle of 
justice in acquisition”. At this point before explaining 
what’s wrong with Nozick’s understanding of the 
Lockean proviso, first I want to explain briefly Locke’s 
property rights and the Lockean proviso.
John Locke’s Property Rights and the Lockean 
Proviso
In “The Second Treatise of Government” [22] Locke 
talks about property rights by saying that the world is 
initially ‘given’ to men in common [23]. That means that 
initially no one has a right to announce his ownership over 
anything and that makes the world initially un-owned. 
However, he continues to claim that men have ‘reason 
to make use of it [the world] to the best advantage of 
life and convenience’ [24]. In the following proposition 
Locke holds that because man is rational in that sense, 
he has a property in his own person; ‘this nobody has 
any right to but himself’. So, Locke considers man as 
‘self-autonomous’ [25] in the sense that man as a rational 
being has a right to preserve himself and a right to use 
nature by means of his own duties. Thus, he concludes, 
“Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature 
hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, 
and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby 
makes it his property, […] at least where there is enough 
and as good left in common for others.” [26] So, even if 
the world is initially not owned by anyone, Locke thinks 
that labor and work of rational man gives rights to the 
man to own the things that are joined to his own labor 
as long as he left enough for other people for performing 
their own labor with the world. Ultimately, this is the 
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Lockean proviso, which has two main components: 
(a) ‘mixing labor’ and (b) ‘enough and as good left in 
common for others’.
Then he continues by saying that laboring is the 
case in which the private and the common property 
are distinguished. Labor gives man the right to have 
private property because man, when he is laboring, adds 
something more to nature and ultimately it makes the 
land his own property [27].  
Now we can ask, what does Locke mean by the idea 
of mixing labor with un-owned land? In this case, as 
Nozick contends, there could be two possible objections 
and concerns about the idea of ‘labor-mixing’. First of 
all, “If a private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he 
mixed his labor with … the whole uninhabited universe 
or just a particular plot?” [28] The point here is that what 
is the extent of mixing the labor with the material in 
question? What distinguishes the land in use and the rest 
of it? If I appropriate an un-owned mountain, do I have 
also the right to have the trees on it? As Rousseau puts it, 
When Nuñez Balboa stood on the shore and took 
possession of the southern seas and of South America 
in the same of the crown of Castile, was that enough to 
dispossess all the inhabitants and to exclude all the other 
princes of the world? If so, such idle ceremonies would 
have had no end; and the Catholic King might without 
leaving his royal chamber have take possession of the 
whole universe, only excepting afterwards those parts of 
his empire already belonging to other princes [29].
Secondly, we may ask whether I own a material 
by inextricably mixing some of my property with that 
material. Nozick asks, “If I own a can of tomato juice and 
spill it into the sea so that its molecules mingle evenly 
throughout the sea, do I thereby come to own the sea, 
or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato juice?” [30] I 
think Nozick’s worry is quite plausible. However, Locke 
has another idea to fix that problem, because otherwise 
the rights of appropriation would have been extremely 
weird. 
This next step is as Jonathan Wolff points out the 
following: “One special feature of course, is that in 
the normal course of things ‘mixing your labor’ with 
something makes it more valuable, or, at least, more 
useful. Locke does indeed attempt to add weight to his 
justification of the appropriation of property by appealing 
to this consideration.” [31] In this respect, the former 
concern about Locke’s view may be met. This is simply 
because, for the case of the astronaut, we can say that 
when he cleans a piece of land on Mars, he doesn’t either 
make the entire universe valuable, or the whole planet. 
His labor may give value to the extent of what he cleans 
and nothing more. For the case of the tomato juice, I 
think Locke would say that the man, who acts in this way, 
makes a big mistake by wasting his tomato juice when he 
spills it into the sea [32]. That is because his action gives 
no more value to the sea. This is not because the proviso 
is not satisfied but because the action in question is not 
an appropriate type of action to be considered as ‘mixing 
labor’.
According to these worries, Nozick thinks that how 
appropriation came about is irrelevant, (so as the ‘mixing-
labor’ criterion’) and what is important is the impact of 
appropriation on other people. Nozick thinks that there is 
an ambiguity of the former. He asks, “Why isn’t mixing 
what I own with what I don’t own a way of losing what I 
own rather than a way of gaining what I don’t?” [33] This 
means that adding a bit of value by mixing the labor does 
not necessarily permit one to own the thing. In this case, 
just like in the tomato juice case, ‘mixing labor’ cannot 
be an appropriate criterion for legitimate acquisition of 
property. It is simply too ambiguous to determine the 
balance between the value added to the material and the 
quantitative threshold for this, which is needed for the 
evaluation.
Nozick’s Interpretation of the Lockean Proviso 
and the Reconstruction
Nozick prefers to bypass this criterion of ‘mixing 
labor’ and stick to the criterion of ‘enough and as good 
left in common for others’. For the latter, one can 
legitimately appropriate a certain amount of x, if there 
will surely be enough left for the others. Even if the 
appropriator has got the whole amount of it, this would 
make the situation better for others by counterbalancing 
the loss of right to appropriate that amount of x (For 
instance, by compensating them with money). In this 
case, how the appropriation came about is less important 
than whether the situation of others worsens by the 
appropriation of that particular appropriation [34]. This 
is for Nozick one legitimate way of putting the Lockean 
proviso (‘enough and as good left in common for others’). 
So, if one’s appropriation is worsening my situation, then 
I have the right to object to that appropriation. This is 
basically, what Nozick takes as his proviso. He says, 
“Locke’s proviso that there be “enough and as good left 
in common for others” (sect. 27) is meant to ensure that 
the situation of others is not worsened” [35].
To understand the extension of this new notion of the 
Proviso, we should first look at Nozick’s argument on page 
176 in ASU; so called the ‘zipping back’ argument. Let’s 
assume that the first man Z who is in a situation, in which 
for him not enough and as good was left to appropriate. 
In this case, the last person, whose appropriation left Z 
without the chance to appropriate, actually worsens Z’s 
situation. Therefore, Y’s appropriation is illegitimate 
under the Lockean Proviso. Then, the next to the last 
person X, who appropriates while leaving Y in a worse 
position, is also not permitted to appropriate. Ultimately, 
with this logic, if we go back to the first person A, his 
appropriation is a permanent one because; following the 
proviso, there is no other person for A to make the situation 
worse for [36]. One consequence for this argument, which 
Nozick criticizes, is that we can conclude that the proviso 
cannot be applied to all instances of appropriation but 
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only to the initial one. 
However, if this is the case, and also we avoid the 
‘labor mixing’ criteria, then we can think why and how 
the appropriation of property in the initial stage can be 
legitimate. Concerning this we can refer to Benjamin 
Tucker’s following conclusion: “It should be stated that, 
however, in the case of land, or of any other material the 
supply of which is so limited that all cannot hold it in 
unlimited quantities, Anarchism undertakes to protect no 
titles except such as are based on actual occupancy and 
use” [37]. Apart from Tucker’s individualist anarchist 
views, the worry here is that intuitively an appropriation 
of a limited material must be limited because initially 
everyone has the right to appropriate. In this case no one 
could have a better title to appropriate more than others, 
but all can have the equal liberty to use it. This worry 
is about being skeptical about the necessity of private 
property in order to have better account of distributive 
justice. 
Contrary to this, Nozick wants to establish unlimited 
rights to property. He thinks that the argument from 
zipping back is too quick. He adds the following concerns 
to legitimize the property rights of appropriation. He 
makes a distinction between two forms of Lockean 
proviso. One way of worsening another’s appropriation 
is ‘by losing the opportunity to improve his situation by 
a particular appropriation or any one’; and secondly ‘by 
no longer being able to use freely what he previously 
could’ [38]. Nozick calls the latter the weaker form and 
the former is the stringent form of the proviso. Nozick 
thinks that the weaker form of the proviso is appropriate 
for his entitlement conception of justice. This is so 
because only the weaker form of the proviso can solve 
the regress problem in the zipping back argument. In the 
case of the weaker form even if one could not appropriate 
any more or no more, one may have another types of 
opportunities to make one’s situation better. In this case, 
even if there is not enough and as good for other persons, 
there would be other things, which ‘counterbalance the 
diminution in opportunity’ [39],  and it is raised by the 
foregoing appropriation. His point with regard to the 
‘counterbalance the diminution in opportunity’ is the 
following:
Here enter the various familiar social considerations 
favoring private property: it increases the social 
product by putting means of production in the hands of 
those who can use them most effectively (profitably); 
experimentation is encouraged, because with separate 
persons controlling resources, there is no one person 
or small group whom someone with a new idea must 
convince to try it out; private property enables people 
to decide on the pattern and types of risks they wish to 
bear, leading to specialized types of risk bearing; private 
property protects future persons by leading some to hold 
back resources from current consumption for future 
markets; it provides alternate sources of employment for 
unpopular persons who don’t have to convince any one 
person or small group to hire, and so on [40].
It is important here to note that Nozick does not 
defend the utilitarian principle favoring private property. 
He argues for these facts about the beneficences of private 
property in order to support the Lockean conception of 
“enough and as good left over”. This claim refers back 
to counterbalancing ‘the diminution in opportunity’ by 
saying that these benefits of a system of private property 
can provide sufficient counterbalancing for the loss of 
people who are left with less or no property at all. From 
here all we can see is that the Nozickean adaptation of 
the Lockean proviso says that appropriation of something 
will be illegitimate if it worsens another person’s situation 
and would have no effective benefit for the system [41]. 
If this explanation is satisfactory, we can look at what 
is misleading in Nozick’s own understanding of the 
Proviso.
Clarification and the Consequences of the 
Nozickean Proviso
In the previous section, I pointed out Nozick’s 
distinction between the weaker form of the proviso and 
the stringent form of it. The following definitions are the 
weaker and stringent forms of the proviso:
The weaker form W: “X must not cause Y to lose the 
opportunity to use freely what he previously could”.
The stringent form S: “W (X must not cause Y to lose 
the opportunity to use freely what he previously could) 
and (S1): X must not cause Y to lose the opportunity to 
improve his situation by a particular appropriation or any 
one, unless something counterbalances the diminution in 
opportunity”.
G. A. Cohen against Nozick has raised the argument 
here [42]. He thinks that, first; S1 in the stringent form 
differs from W in three different ways. Firstly, S1 
focuses on Y’s opportunities to appropriate things; on the 
other hand W focuses on the opportunities to use them. 
Secondly, S1 requires Y’s being not to lose possible 
opportunities to improve his situation; unlikely W does 
not require any possible improvement in Y’s situation, 
instead of this it just prohibits any possible worst off 
situation that Y may encounter then. 
Finally, S1 has a compensation clause, and W has not. 
For the third distinction, Cohen argues that W is weaker 
than S not because it does not contain a compensation 
clause, but it is weaker because W is a conjunct of S. 
The reasons are the following. The compensation clause 
in S1 only satisfies S1 without satisfying W, which 
means that the compensation that Nozick thinks stands 
for any possible worsening situation, in which Y should 
be compensated. In this case Cohen thinks that Nozick 
confuses the distinction between W and S1. Ultimately, 
Nozick’s distinction is actually between W and S2, which 
is S1 without its compensation clause: 
(S2): X must not cause Y to lose the opportunity to 
improve his situation by a particular appropriation or 
any one. 
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Cohen gives three reasons why Nozick confuses his 
distinction. On page 176 in ASU, Nozick tries to avoid 
the regress argument by giving the distinction between W 
and S. He thinks that the stringent form creates a regress, 
but W does not. However, as Cohen clearly states, the 
compensation clause of S prevents the regress there [43]. 
In this case, S2 would create regress, but S does not. 
Recalling the regress argument, the problem was about 
how to prohibit the last appropriation, which is about the 
last bit of property. In this case, if we look at S1 (so as 
S), it provides a compensation, which will work for those 
who cannot appropriate anymore. However, S2 cannot 
trigger the regress. It is simple because any appropriation 
in the initial stage will be a lost in opportunity for the 
others to improve their situation.      
Secondly, on page 178 in ASU, Nozick says, “I 
assume that any adequate theory of justice in acquisition 
will contain a proviso similar to the weaker of the ones 
we have attributed to Locke”. However, the proviso on 
page 178 [44] is not W but rather S1, which includes the 
compensation clause. In this case, Nozick would have 
referred neither to the weaker form nor S2 but S1 (so 
S) in this passage. Therefore, Nozick again confuses his 
distinction. 
Finally, Cohen powerfully claims that the weaker form 
of the proviso prevents the transformation of all common 
land into private property, while some would end up with 
no private property [45]. However, in Nozick’s capitalist 
system it is defensible that some people will end up with 
no property because the system will compensate the loss 
of the propertyless people [46]. Unfortunately, not the 
weaker form but the stringent form of the proviso can 
express the idea of compensation. For instance, imagine 
a mine, in which a good reserve of chemical sources has 
been found. In this situation imagine two persons –for 
simplicity, one of which is a scientist and other is a farmer. 
The scientist has appropriated the mine, while he knows 
that by appropriating the mine he will cause the farmer 
to lose the opportunity to use the mine freely –which he 
previously could use. In this case, from the passage in ASU 
p. 177, we can say that the scientific work of the scientist 
by using these resources will be an indirect compensation 
for the farmer because the farmer will benefit the good 
consequences of these scientific researches. However, in 
order to satisfy such compensation Nozick should have 
appealed to the stringent form and not the weaker form 
of the proviso. Thus we can conclude that Nozick needs 
S1 (so S) rather than W. 
Ultimately, we will conclude that the proviso that 
Nozick wants to establish has the stringent form. As we 
see, even if he says that he needs to buy into the weaker 
form of the proviso, he actually uses and needs the 
stringent form of the proviso because of the necessity 
of the compensation clause. Hence, we can legitimately 
and freely consider the stringent form as the Nozickean 
proviso.
The next issue, which should be solved, is whether 
the clarified version of the Nozickean proviso leads the 
principle of initial acquisition towards being a historical 
and patterned principle. In other words, what are the 
consequences of the more truly stated proviso in terms 
of the principles of initial acquisition? Here I will answer 
the former question positively.
In this case, if we accept that the Nozickean 
proviso has the structure of S, then we should study its 
compensation clause more carefully. Using the proviso 
as the guideline, every possible appropriator should 
consider, a “baseline” of well-being, which posits every 
other’s well-being in the absence of his appropriation. 
Hence this guideline would give a procedure for the 
possible appropriations of holdings. This need of the 
baseline indicates that at least some data of the past or a 
procedure is necessary for a legitimate compensation. In 
this case, Nozick would not claim that the compensation 
would be executed based on past data (historical records) 
simply because it will be the first acquisition of that 
property and there would be no past of its entitlements 
(there was no appropriation before). Hence, the baseline 
cannot be a historical guidance. As Steiner [47] points 
out there is a problem of the market value of the holdings 
in the initial stage. Nozick suggests that reference should 
be made to the economic value, i.e., market prices, of 
appropriated natural resources [48]. However, it is really 
hard to imagine that there could be any reference in the 
initial stage. Any set of prices determined in the initial 
stage would not be accurate because the prices would be 
the same even if individuals appropriated the land, for 
which the appropriation would have been different. In 
other words, for a fixed market value, an exchange of 
property is primarily necessary in order to determine the 
posterior land prices. Because the initial acquisition is the 
step before any possible exchange, we cannot talk about 
a fixed market value [49]. 
Secondly, it seems necessary that a procedure or 
a pattern is needed. Even if somehow we might think 
that a fixed market value can be obtained, it should not 
necessarily fit into people’s personal valuations. Imagine 
that I have appropriated 50 m² fields and 1 m² field has a 
fixed market value of 100 boxes. The compensation value 
is also fixed and that is 25 boxes per 1 turn. Following 
this, if I need to be compensated for 5 m² fields, then I am 
expected to get 125 boxes. Why should I pay attention 
to this initial market value? I may think that my effort to 
irrigate this field is more than the compensation value. 
On the other hand, someone else might think that the 
compensation value is fair. In that case, because we are 
still in a state of nature, I am not sanctioned to sell my 
field. So, the compensation cannot work. Therefore, a 
pattern would be necessary for the initial appropriation 
even if the market value were fixed. 
Finally, I will argue the following. Nozick’s proviso 
requires, as Nozick himself agrees, a restriction on the 
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freedom of appropriators to use their property however 
they want. This is again the necessity of compensation. 
Especially, when this issue comes to the scarce resources, 
Nozick is stricter on the issue. On page 180, he says:
Thus a person may not appropriate the only water hole 
in a desert and charge what he will. Nor may he charge 
what he will if he possesses one, and unfortunately it 
happens that all the water holes in the desert dry up, except 
for his. This unfortunate circumstances, admittedly no 
fault of his, brings into operation the Lockean proviso 
[his interpretation] and limits his property rights.   
Even if his example is too strict to agree with him, 
the problem of restriction is not always too obvious. The 
notion of monopoly and the necessities of life must be 
determined in order for a justification of the restriction 
of freedom on the use of property. As Steiner notes, “But 
what is to count as (i) monopoly, and (ii) the necessities 
of life, is historically a much-disputed issue, and around 
it revolve some of the more profound ideological 
controversies of the last hundred years” [50]. Even 
if we put aside such disputes, we can still argue about 
the waterhole case. In the case of the waterhole, even if 
it is necessary for him to compensate others, still it is 
unanswered how he may charge any cost for the water. 
It is surely his property and he wants to charge a fee for 
the water. Even if this question would be unnecessary, 
I cannot see any other way, which is non-patterned. 
‘Counterbalancing the diminution of opportunity’ is not 
sufficient to show its practical application. Therefore, it 
must be patterned and this must be acceptable for Nozick 
as well.
To conclude this discussion, I will say that it seems to 
me that it is hard for Nozick to deny that the principle of 
initial acquisition of just holdings is not a historical and 
patterned principle. The compensation clause requires a 
way of determination of the lost and its compensation. 
However, no historical approach seems to me possible in 
the case of initial appropriation. In that case, it should be 
an end-result principle. If it is an end-result principle, then 
it requires a pattern for a just compensation. The aim here 
is not try to find a pattern for Nozick, but to show that his 
principle should contain a pattern in order to compensate 
others. Unfortunately, problems that I have argued above 
make it difficult for Nozick to construct a pattern, which 
is distinct from the patterns that he criticizes in ASU.
Two applications of the Nozickean Proviso
If we accept that the Nozickean Proviso has the 
stringent form and the compensation clause of the proviso 
creates a need of pattern, then I will continue arguing 
whether its use stands for a particular appropriation 
(first use) or does it stands for the justification of private 
property in general (second use) [51]. For the former use, 
I will argue that it cannot be applied to the entitlement 
theory and it cannot be the ends of the proviso. For the 
second use, I will argue that there is a problem, which 
Nozick didn’t realize. For Nozick there is only one 
counterfactual case against private property that satisfies 
the proviso, which is ‘no appropriation of land’ at all. 
However, I will show that using the proviso, we can 
imagine a reasonable situation, in which no private 
property entailed, but rather possibly a joint or common 
[52] ownership is preferred. Therefore, there seems to me 
an inconsistency between the means of the proviso and 
the ends of the entitlement theory as a whole. 
I will start with the first use that is the justification 
of particular appropriations. The question here is that if 
someone appropriates something, then does it worsen 
anyone’s conditions (similar to the waterhole example). 
At least Nozick thinks that the proviso enables us to 
be sure that it is necessarily sufficient to determine the 
justification of one particular appropriation because if 
the appropriation worsens someone’s situation, then the 
compensation clause is ready to do its job. However, as 
I have pointed out in the previous section, it is dubious 
to think that compensation clause is sufficient in the 
initial acquisition of holdings to determine the justness 
of particular appropriations. To recall the objections, we 
have the problem of reference to the past, which excludes 
his argument from being a historical argument. The next 
one is the problem of the fixed market value. For this 
objection, I have also noted that even if we can think of 
it as being fixed, there appears another problem, which is 
people’s personal valuation. Hence, we have a problem 
of market valuation vs. personal valuation. Finally, we 
have the problem of restriction of freedom. It derives 
from the fact that determination of what monopoly is and 
the necessities of life are too ambiguous for the initial 
stage of acquisition. Hence, it is hard to claim that any 
restriction of freedom is legitimate in the initial stage. 
Because of these problems the proviso cannot work for 
particular appropriations.  
For the second claim, the worry is not as 
straightforward as the former use of the proviso. Wolff 
puts this use of the proviso clearly when he says, “[…] 
the question to ask is whether those who hold little or no 
private property, are better or worse off than they would 
have been had there been no appropriation at all [italic 
added]” [53]. Surely, the implication of this is on the page 
177 in ASU. Nozick asks, “Is the situation of persons who 
are unable to appropriate (there being no more accessible 
and useful unowned objects) worsened by a system 
allowing appropriation and permanent property?” In the 
following passage Nozick tries to show that this system 
is preferable because of its benefits to everyone. Finally, 
he concludes, “These considerations enter a Lockean 
theory to support the claim that appropriation of private 
property satisfies the intent behind the “enough and as 
good left over” proviso, not as a utilitarian justification 
of property.” [54] Here we can see that his aim is to show 
that the proviso can actually provide us with a justification 
of private property in general. He thinks that the system 
of private property can make those who have less or no 
appropriation at all better off. Therefore, his comparison 
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is between the private appropriation of property and no 
appropriation at all. The latter is, as he thinks the base 
line for comparison. 
To recall, what I am claiming is that while the first use 
of the proviso is problematic for Nozick, the second use 
seems safer. Because he gives reasons, which are nothing 
to do with the worries for the first use, I cannot argue 
against it in the same manner. Ultimately, I will claim 
that Nozick can defend the private property in general by 
the second use of it. However, unfortunately, that does 
not mean that his principle of initial acquisition is in a 
complete security now. The base line that he proposes 
creates a problem for the proviso as well.
Nozick thinks that the only base line for comparison 
is the case, in which no appropriation would have 
occurred, which indicates that the land L continues to be 
unowned. However, on page 181 in ASU, when Nozick 
talks about the cases similar to the case of water hole in 
the desert, he says, “The result may be coextensive with 
some condition about catastrophe, since the baseline for 
comparison is so low as compared to the productiveness 
of a society with private appropriation that the question 
of the Lockean proviso being violated arises only in 
the case of catastrophe”. Here again Nozick thinks that 
leaving the water hole in the desert not appropriated is 
not a good solution because it would be unproductive to 
leave it in such a way. On the other hand, he thinks, the 
system, which allows private property would be better, 
because even when someone monopolizes the water hole, 
it makes the productiveness of the water hole increased. 
Moreover, he should also compensate the loss of others 
due to the fact that he should follow the proviso. 
However, intuitively, we can grasp many other 
counterfactuals or baselines, for which we can compare 
them with the system containing private property. These 
would be, for instance, common ownership, joint-
ownership, etc. For instance, Hillel Steiner points out, 
One solution is to require that no individual’s 
appropriation of unowned natural objects may ever 
be so great as to preclude any other present or future 
individual from making a similar appropriation. This 
stringently conservationist interpretation of the just 
initial acquisition requirement, unwieldy as it would be, 
seems to be only one which can circumvent the necessity 
of periodic redistribution [55]. 
Basically, what Steiner here claims is that private 
appropriation in the initial acquisition would make 
the future generations worst off and no individual 
appropriation of property can be justifiable because they 
would have been vague in terms of such problems. 
Cohen underlines the reasons why another type of 
baseline is preferable and is neglected by the entitlement 
theorists. He says, “[…] entitlements theorists tend to 
neglect the value people may place on the kind of power 
relations in which they stand to others, a neglect that 
is extraordinary in supposed libertarians professedly 
committed to human autonomy and the overriding 
importance of being in charge of one’s own life” [56]. 
Cohen’s aim is to show that exploitation can be the 
product of privatization of the land.  We may agree on his 
consideration that people will prefer not being harmed 
by exploitation, while withdrawing all of the benefits of 
the system of private property. In this case, it cannot be 
true by saying that “it is not only permissible that people 
enclose the commons, but is in fact morally obligatory” 
[57]. If this is the case, then we should find historical 
evidence that can establish this claim. Elman Service 
made a historical claim about the archaic civilizations. 
He says, “In all of the archaic civilizations and 
historically known chiefdoms and primitive states, the 
stratification was mainly of two classes, the governors 
and the governed –political strata, not strata of ownership 
groups. […] At least this is not recorded in the historical 
cases, not is it visible in the archaeological record” [58]. 
Basically, we can at least claim that in the initial state the 
private property had got nothing to do with the political 
means. Despite the fact that we are not so sure, I will say 
that Service’s historical claim and Cohen’s philosophical 
claim are enough to conclude that private appropriation 
is not morally obligatory.      
From all of these considerations, it is sufficient to 
conclude that there are different baselines –opposing to 
Nozickean baseline, in which the appropriation could 
takes place. For the common ownership, on the one hand, 
the land is appropriated collectively, for joint-ownership, 
on the other, the land is owned privately but the right to use 
it depends on a consensus agreed with by the landowners. 
So, these baselines must be taken seriously by Nozick in 
order to show that system of private property is much 
more desirable. My intention here is not to compete with 
Nozick in terms of which of these systems is preferable, 
but I have pinpointed that at least one of these other 
systems could be accumulated by the Nozickean proviso 
as well. In short, the Nozickean proviso can establish a 
system, which entitled no private property but a common 
or joint ownership of the holdings.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I’ve showed that Nozick’s main claim that 
the Entitlement Theory is a historical and non-patterned 
principle is not exhaustive for all of its compounds. 
Conclusively, the principle of justice in acquisitions is not 
a historical and non-patterned principle. The Nozickean 
proviso, which is adapted from Locke’s original version, 
is not a good candidate of a non-patterned principle 
because of its compensation clause. Additionally, the 
case of the initial appropriation cannot be historical 
because it has no past indexed for it. In a summary, it 
is appropriate to say that Nozick’s misunderstanding 
lies behind all of these problems. As we have seen, the 
form that he textually commits has consequences, which 
necessitates pattern(s) for distribution and appropriation 
of property. In this case, it is a bad luck for him that he 
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hadn’t realized these problems. After all, the core of his 
theory is apparently the principle of justice in acquisition 
and the proviso, which initiates it.
REFERENCES
[1]  Some parts of this paper are originally published 
in “Can the Nozickean Proviso Guide Homo 
habilis?: Cognitive and Evolutionary Criticism of 
the ‘Historicty’ of the Entitlement Theory” (Erdenk 
2010).
[2]  Nozick 1974. Abbreviated as ASU.
[3]  Ibid., p. ix.
[4]  Here basically Nozick considers the rights to 
holdings, self-autonomy and the rights to participate 
to the free-market.
[5]  Ibid., pp. 153-155.
[6]  Ibid., pp. 155-160.
[7]  Ibid., p. 150.
[8]  Ibid.
[9]  Ibid., p. 152.
[10]  Ibid., p. 153-154.
[11]  Ibid., p. 155.
[12]  Ibid., p. 156.
[13]  Ibid., pp. 157-158.
[14]  Here I mean that the principle, except the principle 
of rectification, do not direct the distribution of 
property like the patterned principles.
[15]  Ibid., p. 160.
[16]  Ibid.
[17]  Steiner 1977a, p. 44.
[18]  Nozick, p. 174.
[19]  Ibid., p. 160.
[20]  As a response for a possible objection to this, I will 
say that what I mean by ex nihilo is there is a material 
need in order to produce something (i.e. in order to 
aggregate a field is needed, so the production in this 
field is not ex nihilo but depended on the existence 
of the field).
[21]  Cohen 1986a, p. 119.
[22]  Locke 1980. Abbreviated as ST.
[23]  ST, I: 1.
[24]  ST, V: 26.
[25]  Not to overwhelmingly extend the paper, I do not 
want to fall into a discussion that may argue what 
‘self-autonomy’ means. I will leave that phrase odd 
not to emphasize on it. Any argument from this 
phrase is tolerable for the paper.
[26]  ST, V: 27.
[27]  ST, V: 28-29.
[28]  Nozick, p. 174.
[29]  Rousseau 1954, p. 67.
[30]  Nozick, p. 175.
[31]  Wolff 1991, pp. 103-4.
[32]  Here, it is clear that this action does not conflict 
with the proviso. However, this specific action is 
simply inconsistent with Locke’s understanding of 
the mixing labor with the land (See. ST, V).
[33]  Nozick, pp. 174-5.
[34]  Ibid., p. 175.
[35]  Ibid.
[36]  Ibid., p. 176.
[37]  Quoted in: Wolff 1991, p. 108.
[38]  Nozick, p. 176.
[39]  Ibid.
[40]  Ibid., p. 177.
[41]  From the quote above we can infer this. Nozick 
means to say that all of the consequences of a 
given appropriation should be considered in 
order to determine whether this appropriation 
worsen another or not. In this case if a particular 
appropriation improves the system of private 
property such that it has similar effects as the ones 
listed above than this particular appropriation can 
be said to be legitimate, regardless of the other’s 
loss of opportunity to appropriate.
[42]  Cohen 1986a, p. 120, footnote 17.
[43]  Ibid., p. 121.
[44]  Nozick says; “Someone whose appropriation 
otherwise would violate the proviso still may 
appropriate provided he compensates the others so 
that their situation is not thereby worsened; unless 
he does compensate these others, his appropriation 
will violate the proviso of the principle of justice in 
acquisition and will be an illegitimate one” (Nozick, 
p. 178).
[45]  Cohen 1986a, p. 122.
[46]  See the long quotation on pages 9.
[47]  Steiner 1977a, p. 45-47.
[48]  Nozick, p. 177.
[49]  For instance, one can claim 100 boxes for one turn of 
potato field, while someone else claims 500 boxes. 
Who will have the burden of proof, if compensation 
becomes necessary?
[50]  Steiner 1977a, p. 47; see the footnote.
[51]  This issue is raised by Jonathan Wolff (1991, p. 
112).
[52]  For common ownership see Hillel Steiner (1981). 
For joint-ownership see G. A. Cohen (1986b).
[53]  Wolff 1991, p. 112.
[54]  Nozick, p. 177.
[55]  Steiner 1977b, p. 151.
[56]  Cohen 1986a, p. 127. See also the whole section in 
which Cohen discusses other baselines and argues 
the worsening by exploitation.
[57]  Schmidtz 1990.
[58]  Service 1975, p. 285.
30 E. A. Erdenk / JAPHS, 1 (1): 21-30, 2010
Bibliography
Cohen, G. A 1986a: Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, 
and Equality, in Will Kymlicka (ed.) 1992: Justice 
in Political Philosophy Vol. 1. Mainstream Theories 
of Justice, Great Britain: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 377- 392.
 ——— 1986b: Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and 
Equality: Part II, in Will Kymlicka (ed.) 1992: 
Justice in Political Philosophy Vol. 1. Mainstream 
Theories of Justice, Great Britain: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 392- 405.
Erdenk, A. Emre 2010: Can the Nozickean Proviso 
Guide Homo habilis? Cognitive and Evolutionary 
Criticism of the Entitlement Theory. Saarbrücken: 
Lambert Academic Pub. 
Locke, John 1980: Second Treatise of Government. C. B. 
MacPherson (ed.), Indianapolis: Hackett Pub.
Nozick, Robert 1974: Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New 
York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers.     
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 1954: Social Contract. 
Willmoore Kendall (trans.) Chicago: The Henry 
Regnery Co.
Steiner, Hillel 1977a: “The Natural Right to the Means 
of Production”. Philosophical Quarterly, 27, pp. 
41- 49. 
——— 1977b: “Justice and Entitlement”. Ethics, 87 No. 
2, pp. 150-152.
——— 1981: “Liberty and Equality”. Political Studies, 
XXIX (4), December, pp. 555- 569.
Schmidtz, David 1990: “When is Original Appropriation 
Required?” Monist, 73 No. 4, pp. 504- 18.
Service, Elman R. 1975: Origins of the State and 
Civilization. New York: Norton Press.
Tucker, Benjamin 1991: Instead of a Book. Cited from 
the book “Robert Nozick” by Jonathan Wolff. 
California: Stanford University Press, p. 108. 
Wolff, Jonathan 1991: Robert Nozick. California: 
Stanford University Press.
